

November 10, 1925 ^{12(?)}

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Employment of negro man power in war.

I am enclosing a study on the Employment of Negro Man Power in War, made by a committee of The Army War College composed of Colonel Bishop, Major Drain and Major Somervell. It is based on research by previous classes, by the Faculty, as well as on War Department experiences during the World War. It is believed to be of such value in lieu of further study by the General Staff, as to furnish a basis for the employment of the negro in the next war. I recommend, unless and until a more complete study be made on the subject by the General Staff, that it be accepted as the War Department policy in handling this problem.

While the basic communication is not marked "Secret", it has been so regarded at the War College.

H. E. Ely,
Major General U. S. A.
Commandant.

2 incls.
(in dup)

Notes on proposed plan for use of negro manpower.
(Not a part of the plan)

1. The fundamental conception upon which this plan is based is that the military man power of the United States, white or black, should be assigned to duties in the Army for which it is qualified. Military considerations alone should govern in war.

2. The negro does not perform his share of civil duties in time of peace in proportion to his population. He has no leaders in industrial or commercial life. He takes no part in government. Compared to the white man he is admittedly of inferior mentality. He is inherently weak in character.

3. The negro issue should be met squarely. The War Department had no pre-determined and sound plan for the use of negro troops at the beginning of the World War. It had no adequate defense against political and racial pressure and was forced to organize negro combat divisions and commission unqualified negro officers. The results are well known.

4. The War Department when occasion demands should be able to present this matter frankly to those who make demands or should know the facts.

The negro, particularly the officer, failed in the World War. The door will not be closed against him on this account.

He will be given an opportunity to take part in war in accordance with his qualifications in exactly the same field of activity as are allotted the white man.

He will be accepted for service by the identical standards applied to the white man.

While in the service he will be measured by the standards applied to the white man. This includes, reclassification, elimination, and rewards of promotion and decoration.

He will be given a sound plan of organization, training and leadership.

He will be given tasks he may reasonably be expected to perform.

If he makes good he will have the opportunity eventually to fight in the war with all-negro organizations.

If he fails to qualify to fight as a race he will be limited to such tasks as he can perform under white leadership.

What he accomplishes in War will depend upon the negro.

5. There should be no sentiment about the use of negro troops in war.

It is not sound to contend that he should bear losses in war in proportion to his population relative to white population. The basis of his employment in war should be that applied to white soldiers, viz., qualifications and capabilities for military service.

In the American Expeditionary Forces in France the negro's total share of losses was 1-1/2%.

6. If the negro should be called into service on a plan based on the numerical strength of his population his share of man power for the Mobilization Plan would be almost twice the quota, which under the standards developed in the World War, he can furnish.

7. The Mobilization Plan provides for approximately 140,000 negroes for non-combatant duty. This would leave approximately 30,000 for the experiment of combat duty.

8. The majority of negroes left at home will be in the southern states where they will be needed for labor and where they can best be handled by competent whites.

THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT.

Washington Barracks, D. C.
October 30, 1925

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: The use of negro man power in war.

I. Papers accompanying.

Reference "A". Analysis of the physical, mental, moral and psychological qualities and characteristics of the negro as a sub-species of the human family.

Reference "B" Performance of the negro in past wars.

Reference "C" The Negro officer.

Reference "D" Negro political activity in the World War.

Reference "E" Plan for the organization and employment in war of the negro man power drafted and found physically and mentally qualified for military service.

II. The problem presented

Under the Constitution the negro has the rights of citizenship. He forms a considerable part of the population of the United States. It is evident that he must bear his share of the burden of war.

To what extent shall negro man power be used in a military effort contemplated by the War Department General Mobilization Plan?

How shall it be organized?

How shall it be officered?

How shall it be trained and employed in the Theatres of Operations and the Zone of the Interior?

What standards should be used in the appointment and promotion of negro officers?

III. Facts bearing upon the problem.

1. The Negro is physically qualified for combat duty.

He is by nature subservient and believes himself to be inferior to the white man.

He is most susceptible to the influence of crowd psychology.

He can not control himself in the fear of danger to the extent the white man can.

He has not the initiative and resourcefulness of the white man.

He is mentally inferior to the white man.

Reference "A".

2. In past wars the negro has made a fair laborer.
As a technician and a fighter he has been inferior to
the white man.

Reference "B"

3. In the World War the negro officer was a failure in combat.

Reference "C"

4. In the World War political pressure forced the formation
of two negro combat divisions and the commissioning of about 600 negro
officers.

Reference "D"

5. There are 11,000,000 negroes in the United States. The
total number which according to the standards developed in the World War
are qualified to be soldiers is 352,922. Applying the same standards to
the white man we find that the negro can furnish 6.18 of the total man
power in the United States qualified for military service. On this basis
his contribution of man power to the total required by the War Department
General Mobilization Plan is 209,679.

Reference "E"

IV. Opinion of the War College

1. In the process of evolution the American negro has not
progressed as far as the other sub-species of the human family. As a
race he has not developed leadership qualities. His mental inferiority
and the inherent weaknesses of his character are factors that must be
considered with great care in the preparation of any plan for his employ-
ment in war.

2. The life of the nation is at stake in war. Neither the
white man nor the negro should be given tasks they are not qualified to
perform. However, the plan for the use of the man power of the United
States in war should be fair to both races.

3. In the past wars the negro has made a fair laborer, but an
inferior technician. As a fighter he has been inferior to the white man
even when led by white officers.

4. The negro officer was a failure as a combat officer in the
World War.

5. The door should not be closed against the negro because
of his failure in the World War. He should be given a fair opportunity
to perform the tasks in war for which he is qualified or may qualify
himself under a sound plan of organization, training and leadership.
He should be measured by the same standards applied to the white man.

6. In making effective the War Department General Mobilization Plan the total number of negroes to be taken into the military service should be 209,679.

7. The largest negro unit that should be organized on mobilization is the battalion. These battalions should be assigned to divisions of the Regular Army and the National Guard in the proportion of one battalion to a division for combat training. If and when these battalions demonstrate satisfactory combat efficiency they should be grouped progressively into larger units with the division as the ultimate aim.

8. Negro soldiers as individuals should not be assigned to white units.

9. The total number of negro combat units to be organized or mobilization should be sufficient to form one complete Infantry division less headquarters of larger units. This number should be organized into battalions, trains, etc., and distributed by services and branches in the proportions indicated by tables of organization for the Infantry divisions. The remainder of the negro quota, after deducting the number necessary for training and replacement purposes and frontier and other duty in the Zone of the Interior, should be assigned to the Engineers, Quartermaster Corps, Air Service, Cavalry, Coast Artillery, and Medical Department in accordance with the occupational qualifications of the men and the needs of these services.

10. At the beginning of the war the negro combat units should be officered entirely by white officers except in the grade of lieutenant. Only negro officers who hereafter graduate from training camps where they have qualified for appointment as combat officers in accordance with standards applied to white candidates should be assigned to these units. The white officers assigned to negro combat units should be carefully selected.

11. White and negro lieutenants should be assigned to negro combat units in numbers to insure that at all times the companies will have double the number of lieutenants in corresponding white organizations. During the period of combat training the number of negro lieutenants in negro combat units should not exceed the number of white lieutenants.

12. Initially negro officers above the grade of lieutenant, and all other negro officers not included in Par. 10 above, should be assigned in general to non-combatant units of negro troops. They should be observed, tested, reclassified, eliminated or advanced eventually to combat assignments in accordance with the standards applied to white officers.

13. Negro officers should not be placed over white officers, noncommissioned officers or soldiers.

14. Negro officer candidates should attend training camps with white candidates. They should have the same instructors, take the same tests and meet the same requirements for appointment as officers as the white candidates. They should be sheltered, messed and instructed separately from white candidates.

15. Citations, decorations, and promotion for demonstrated efficiency should be given the negro in accordance with the standards applied to the white man.

16. This plan provides for the initial assignment of negro man power at the outbreak of war. It will be seen that the eventual use of the negro will be determined by his performance in combat training and service. If and when the battalions assigned to white divisions qualify for combat service, they will be assigned to this duty. If the negro makes good the way is left open for him to go into combat eventually with all-negro units. If the negro officer fails to demonstrate his ability to lead his own troops they will be led by white officers. The formation of all-negro units should be made gradually, starting with the company. They should be led by negro officers who have demonstrated their ability to lead. When they have qualified for combat duty they should be given an opportunity to demonstrate in combat whether or not they should progress to larger units.

17. The guiding principle in this plan is military efficiency. The plan is believed to be eminently fair to both the negro and the white man.

Political or racial pressure should not be allowed to alter it.

V. Action recommended.

It is recommended that this study be taken as the basis of the policy of the War Department for the use of negro manpower and that the plan proposed herein be used as a guide in the revision of the War Department General Mobilization Plan.

VI. Concurrences.

The policies and plan for the use of negro man power proposed in this study are the culmination of several years study by the faculty and student body of the Army War College.

H.E. Ely,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commandant.

REFERENCE "A"

ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL, MENTAL, MORAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL QUALITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEGRO.

1. Physical.

During the World War statistics indicate that rejections of Class I registrants for white and negro races were respectively, 30.2% and 25.4%. Without investigation this might seem to indicate that the negro is physically superior to the white. It appears, however, that the standards prescribed for the whites were not maintained for the negro. Rates of non-effectives in negro units were so high as to cause a protest from General Pershing. He wired, "Colored Stevedore troops arriving with tuberculosis, old fractures, extreme flat feet, hernia, venereal diseases all existing prior to enlistment, not able to stand hardship of climate and travel, larger proportion of sick than among white troops. Recommend elimination of unfit by rigid physical examination before embarking."

Based upon his observation of the poor physical condition of colored stevedore troops, orders were issued to eliminate the physical unfit negroes before their departure from a port of embarkation. After the issue of such orders, 43% of 3,604 colored drafted men sent from Camp Pike to Newport News were found unfit for overseas service on medical examination at the port of embarkation. Authority had, however, been given in this case to send on from Camp Pike men suffering from venereal disease but not receiving daily treatment."

"The physical condition of a large part of the colored draft is very poor. Many must be entirely eliminated and a large portion of those left are not fit for combat duty." - Lytle Brown, A. C. of S., W. P. D., to Chief of Staff.

"A further examination into this case shows that the Commanding General, Camp Pike was not trying to unload undesirables on the Port of Embarkation. He realized they were for overseas service and he sent the pick of what he had but that is the class of men the colored drafted men were. Other examples could be given but it would be cumulative testimony along the same lines." - Col. E. D. Anderson, G. S., Chairman, Operations Branch.

Taking this case, which is stated to be more or less typical, the Surgeon at Camp Pike said: "From a conservative estimate I will state that fully 90% of all negroes received at the Depot Brigade, now have or have had venereal diseases in some form."

The situation with reference to the physical condition of negroes during the war is shown in the following quotation from a report from Col. Anderson to the Chief of Staff:- "The present policy is to accept men with certain ailments along this line and to send them to the camps to receive the necessary treatment before starting them on their training. The large percentage of colored men temporarily unfit reduces the effective strength while the space they occupy might well be used by able-bodied men." This difference between whites and negroes is also apparent in the disability discharge rate which was, respectively 42 and 80 per thousand.

From this it is clear that the number of physical defectives among the negroes was much higher than among the whites and that full weight can not be given to the figures of the Provost Marshal General, as different standards were used in the physical examination of white and negro draftees. It can be further deduced from this that the negro is physically inferior to the white man and that more rigid examinations must be conducted in the

next war. The Southern negroes, who form the bulk of the race endurance and stamina in cold rigorous climates is low. His normal physical activity is generally small, due to his laziness.

2. Mental.

It is generally recognized that the pure blood American negro is inferior to our white population in mental capacity. Such negroes as have shown marked mental attainments also show a heavy strain of white blood.

"The negroes are descended from slave imported from West Africa. Their characteristics, physically, were formerly quite uniform and show them to be very low in the scale of human evolution." The cranial cavity of the negro is smaller than the white; his brain weighing 35 ounces contrasted with 45 for the white.

The intelligence of the negro is shown in his ability to compete with the white in professions and other activities in peace time when mental equipment is an essential for success.

To turn to a statistical proof of this mental inferiority we have only to consider the intelligence tests conducted during the war. In the table following, taken from page 707 of the Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, "Group IV is approximately a pro-rata selection by States so that the entire group is geographically representative of the country at large." The table shows "at once the striking inferiority of the colored recruits." The comparison is as follows:

RACE	NO. OF CASES	D-	D	C-	C+	C	B	A
Whites, Group I, II, IV	93,973	7.0	17.1	23.8	25.0	15.0	8.0	4.1
Negroes, Group IV	18,891	49.0	29.7	12.9	5.7	2.0	0.6	0.1

The striking thing about this table is that only 0.1% were rated as superior or 1/41st of the whites so rated and that practically one-half (49%) were rated as d-, a grade considered "too poor to make a satisfactory soldier." The loss expected in the whites in this respect is only 7%. These memoirs give several other comparisons which present cumulative testimony along this line.

The distribution of these men is not all uniform, however, as is shown in the following graph:

From this we can expect to find the fewest number of mentally crippled Negroes in the Northern States.

The A and B grades officer material, in so far as mental equipment is concerned, are likewise quite apparent from the table and graph. Written comment was invited from the officers who made the rating and their responses are summarized as follows:-

(a) All officers, without exception, agree that the Negro lacks initiative, displays little or no leadership, and cannot accept responsibility. Some point out that these defects are greater in the Southern Negro.

The actual mental test on Negro officers and officer candidates at Camp Dodge was as follows:

Officer Group	No. of Cases	D-	D	C-	C	C	B	A
White officers	1,385	0.1	0.3	0.7	6.2	12.3	31.2	49.2
Negro officers	95	3.3	10.0	5.3	22.1	21.0	24.2	14.7
Negro officers' training camp	273	2.2	10.5	20.8	35.6	19.4	8.1	3.4

Despite the unfavorable showing of these few Negroes, it will be noted that the percentages of white in this table are below the general average of whites at that camp and that Camp Dodge was only about average among the whole number of camps.

Rank of camps by intelligence ratings
of Officers

Per cent A Grade	Camp	Per cent A and B Grades	Previous figures per cent A and B Grades
89.0	Humphreys	99.6	97.8
65.3	Taylor	90.0	--
60.2	Travis	89.7	--
63.1	Lewis	89.0	--
63.6	Meade	87.9	91.9
59.6	Sherman	87.0	92.0
59.2	Dodge	86.6	87.0
59.0	Devens	86.6	--
60.5	Jackson	86.2	81.6
52.0	Grant	85.4	--
53.5	Upton	85.3	--
53.6	Pike	83.6	82.0
51.2	Sheridan	82.0	79.8
47.0	Wadsworth	79.1	78.0
40.4	Cody	78.8	--
34.7	Wheeler	70.5	--
29.0	Greenleaf	64.1	--

3. Morals.

As judged by white standards, the negro is unmoral. His ideas with relation to honor and sex relations are not on the same plane as those of our white population. Petty thieving, lying, and promiscuity are much more common among negroes than among whites. Atrocities connected with white women have been the cause of considerable trouble among negroes. Experience before and in the World War showed that the negro will protect his color in cases of emergency without regard to truth. The same lack of honesty was evident with reference to reports, the lack of information being supplied from an active imagination.

"The negro officer has in my opinion been a failure. He has not the fine points of honor which should characterize the American Army officer." C. O. of Regt. of 92nd Div.

I do not remember of a single patrol report coming from an officer that ever gave sufficient information x x x practically every report had to be checked by some white officer. The check nearly always showed total ignorance on the part of the negro leader and usually a disregard of truth. Also, it is another fact which we found that colored officers cliqued together and sought at all times to protect the members of their own race, no matter whether they were right or wrong." - C. of S., 92nd Division.

"The conclusion forced by the observation of a large number of cases was that the colored officer was of almost no value in the conduct of night patrols. He would perhaps go out a short distance, kill a lot of time, and return with a report of conditions as could just as readily have been written if he had not gone out at all. Or, by some flight of the imagination, he would concoct a fanciful story of places and events entirely non-existent, but difficult to disprove at the time." - C.G., 92d Division.

If this was the state of affairs among their more intelligent picked men, i.e., their officers, the situation with regard to the rank and file can be well imagined.

4. Psychological.

One is inclined to believe that a member of one race is not fitted to write authoritatively on the psychology of another. The white mind and the negro mind are very different. Some people claim to understand the negroes while others whose opinions are of just as much weight say that this is impossible. There are, however, certain factors that influence the psychology of the American negro and to a certain extent we may go.

All American negroes are descendants of some tribe or tribes of Africa. From these antecedents the negro inherits a profoundly superstitious nature. The belief in fetiches exists to this day and the negro will still take great stock in signs and omens. These are very real to the negro and overpower and at times supplant the veneer of religious culture he has acquired from the whites.

The negro's racial experience as a slave has bred in him a peculiar form of mind. He has become by nature sub-servient. He instinctively regards the white man as his superior. He is willing to give away to the white man as a general rule and he does this unthinkingly. His period of service as a slave and his mental caliber cause him to accept unhesitatingly as proper and natural, work that would disgust the white.

In general the negro is jolly, docile and tractable, and lively but with harsh or unkind treatment can become stubborn, sullen and unruly. Innate secretiveness is a part of his nature. This may be a result of his period of existence as a slave. It was then his one sure weapon of

defense, as a race, against the whites.

A curious feature of the negro's psychology is his susceptibility to the influence of crowd psychology. We have had some painful experiences along this line in the army, notably the Brownsville riot. Other cases have occurred entirely without the military establishment wherein crowd psychology has seized upon a mass or group of negroes and precipitated a race war. It is useless to examine the causes of these for the plain facts are that regardless of causes individual negroes of the crowd would never have behaved as they have done were it not for the influence of the crowd. There is no race that is not susceptible to crowd psychology but the negro is easier swayed by it and harder to control when under its influence than others.

Closely allied to crowd psychology is the question of physical courage. In physical courage it must be admitted that the American negro falls well back of the white man and possibly behind all other races. All men, if not actually afraid of death are anxious in varying measures to avoid it. Self-preservation is said to be the first law of nature and self-preservation is but the natural avoidance of an early extinction. All members of the human family in common with all animals possess the instinct for self-preservation and the negro probably possesses it in no greater measure than the rest of mankind. The white, in general, is able to control his fear in the presence of danger and keep about the occupation in which he is engaged with at least a semblance of coolness. The negro, on the other hand, is not so capable in controlling the instinct of self-preservation. His psychological makeup is such that he is unable to control his emotions beyond a certain point. When this point is reached the "cave in" occurs and then all his efforts are bent on self-preservation. Duty, propriety, discretion and obligation are all thrown to the winds. This cannot, however, be held against him. No reasoning being can expect more of a certain nature than exists in that nature. The reason that the negro gives way under fear of some danger is exactly the same reason as that which causes the white to do the same, only the negro is likely to do so under less pressure than the white and consequently his breaking point will come more quickly. It may be likened to putting a continually increasing strain on a rope. It finally breaks because the material of which it is made is not strong enough to stand the added pull. There is this to be said however: As the negro recognizes the white as his superior he will under white control, and in the presence of whites, stand much greater pressure from impending danger than he will in a group of negroes alone.

Another feature that affects the psychology of the negro is his close association with the white race during the past two centuries. This has had an effect in two ways. Within limits the negro has acquired a veneer of the white man's culture. The negro has taken up the white man's religion and while with some the matter of religious conviction is deep-seated and real in general, it is believed to be superficial; and, were contact with the whites removed, would soon degenerate into superstitious forms or be effaced entirely. No race could have stood the amount of oppression in the form of slavery, openly expressed contempt, injustice, enforced segregation, etc., that the negro has from the white without evolving a form of psychology against the white. It would be futile for us to try to believe that the negro has no peculiar state of mind against us. He undoubtedly has. While the negro must feel some tinge of resentment against the race that has enslaved him in the past and now holds him as a thing apart, it must be agreed that this state of mind is to a great extent allayed by the innate easy-going nature of the negro.

The psychology of the negro, based on heredity derived from mediocre

African ancestors, cultivated by several generations of slavery, followed by about three generations of evolution from slavery in the anomalous state of legal without actual equality with the white, is one from which we cannot expect to draw leadership material.

Summarizing these characteristics, it appears that:-

The negro is profoundly superstitious.

He is by nature sub-servient and naturally believes himself inferior to the white.

He is jolly, tractable, lively and docile by nature, but through real or supposed harsh or unjust treatment may become sullen and stubborn.

He is very susceptible to the influence of crowd psychology. In consequence of this a panic among negro troops is much more serious and harder to control than one among whites.

The psychology of the negro is such that we may not expect to draw leadership material from his race. The negro has not a great deal of confidence in leaders of his own race and it would be an impossibility to place leaders of his race over whites.

The psychology of the negro is such that whites as leaders he can serve in combat troops. He has confidence in the superiority of the white and the fact that whites are with him in time of danger puts off the time when his courage gives out.

He has not the physical courage of the white. He simply cannot control himself in fear of some danger in the degree that the white man can.

His psychology is such that he willingly accepts hard labor and for this reason can well be employed in labor troops or other non-combatant branches.

The negro is unmoral. He simply does not see that certain things are wrong.

The negro is one of the most secretive in the world.

While the negro undoubtedly has a state of mind bordering on resentment directed against the white, this feeling is numbed by his easy going nature.

The negro's growing sense of importance will make them more and more of a problem, and racial troubles may be expected to increase.

5. Social.

The negro's physical, mental, moral, and other psychological characteristics have made it impossible for him to associate socially with any except the lowest class of whites. The only exceptions to this are the negro concubines who have sometimes attracted men who, except for this association, were considered high class.

The social inequality makes the close association of whites and blacks in military organization inimicable to harmony and efficiency.

REFERENCE "B"

PERFORMANCE OF NEGRO IN PAST WARS

I. Introduction.

The performance of the negro in past wars deals solely with the American negro. It must be remembered that French colored troops are exclusively recruited from among the most mentally primitive populations and it would be impossible to compare them to the colored population of the United States. Even the French dark skinned Colonial levies in the World War have been found available as combat troops only in very limited numbers and under special conditions and long and slow training by competent officers.

II. Period prior to the World War.

1. During the Revolutionary War few negroes were used, but no unit composed entirely of negroes was ever raised. The so called "Rhode Island Black Regiment" was a battalion of four companies organized in 1778; less than half were negroes and their service was apparently satisfactory.

2. Two battalions of negroes participated in the Battle of New Orleans (War of 1812), where they fought behind entrenchments with white troops, closely supported by artillery. All the officers were white and their service was apparently satisfactory.

3. In the Civil War after the Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863) some 178,000 negroes were mustered into the service, as infantry, cavalry and artillery. With but few exceptions their officers were white. Their service met with many commendatory orders, but instances arose where units were reported incompetent, and cases of mutinies and misbehaviour also occurred when leadership was not efficient.

4. During the Indian Campaigns, Spanish War and Philippine Insurrection the Regular negro regiments participated in a number of engagements. Their officers were almost without exception white and the noncommissioned officers and many men had long service, and were well disciplined. Their service was satisfactory.

5. Prior to the World War several instances have occurred of note between negro soldiers and white civilians, such as the Houston and Brownsville affairs.

III. World War Record of the Negro

1. During the World War great numbers of labor and service battalions were raised from the negroes. A complete combat division, the 92nd, was organized in which the company officers of infantry and machine gun units were negroes. This division had service on the quiet fronts and in reserve in the Argonne, one regiment of which was in the front line. Its conduct was so bad that it was removed in a few days, the regimental commander asking for the removal of 35 negro officers for inefficiency and cowardice. The organizations that had white officers were markedly superior in this division to those that had colored. The trains and special services were reasonably efficient. The heavy artillery regiment with all white officers was the best negro unit.

2. The 93d Division really consisted of four separate infantry regiments and served under the French. In one regiment all officers were white, in two others where there had been colored officers, whites finally replaced them. In the third a regular white officer commanded. These units did good service but were not up to the standard of either our own or French white organizations.

3. The combat record of the 92d Division with relative order as to the other 28 combat divisions in the A.E.F. is as follows:

92d Division

Total No. of Combat Divisions	Days in Sector			Kilometers advanced against enemy Kil. Rel order	Prisoners captured		Casualties			
	Quiet	Active	Rel Ord.		No.	Rel Order	Battle Deaths	Suffered Wounded	Rel. Order	
29	51	2	(19)	1.02	(24) #	38	(27) X	185	1,495	(26) X

Extract from "The War with Germany" - by Chief of Statistics Branch of the General Staff, pages 114-117 incl.

Of the 5 divisions lower in relative order, only one (29th Div.) had more days in a sector.

X Divisions lower in relative order had less days in a sector.

4. The negro has never shared losses in proportion to his share of the population (approximately 10%). In the World War the losses suffered by negro troops in the A.E.F. as compared to white troops were as follows:

Division	Battle Deaths	Wounded	Total Casualties
92d	185	1,495	1,680
93d	<u>574</u>	<u>2,009</u>	<u>2,583</u>
Total Negro	759	3,504	4,263
Total all	48,909	237,135	286,044
<u>Troops</u>			
Negro % of total	1 1/2%	1 1/2%	1 1/2%

Extracts Pages 116-117 of above-mentioned source.

#Division commander stated, "I published an order stating that 80% of the cases found in the hospitals were there by reason of accidental or self-inflicted wounds."

IV. The Negro in Labor Units.

1. The negro has run true to form as regards his occupational classifications. He is exceptionally well fitted for Pioneer Infantry, Supply Trains (Animal or Motor Drawn), Labor Troops in S.O.S., Remount Depots, Home Guards at Supply Depots, Service Detachments at Corps, Army and S.O.S. Hq. and at the many schools in constant operation. Experience has shown that cooks and waiters at officers' messes in all except divisional or corps troops, might well be colored. Thousands of men are needed on lines of communication and for ground work with the air services. Service such as is performed by the Colored Detachment at West Point might well be performed by colored soldiers at all headquarters from Division up.

2. An opinion expressed by many experienced officers who have had long service with negro troops is as follows:

"The negro does not desire combat duty under conditions of present day warfare. That if when drafted into service he was given a choice of assignment to a combat organization or to a "Labor Battalion" (a more attractive title would be better for this class of duty, e.g., 'Service of Conservation and Repair') the majority would choose the less dangerous service."

V. Combat Characteristics of the Negro.

1. Generally speaking, taking the average of the Draft, only about six percent - less than eight per cent - have the characteristics to be combat soldiers - from the mental standpoint alone, hence the difficulty of finding suitable noncommissioned officers, for they must not only be mentally fit, but likewise possess initiative and courage.

2. An opinion held in common by practically all officers is that the negro is a rank coward in the dark. His fear of the unknown and unseen will prevent him from ever operating as an individual scout with success. His lack of veracity causes unsatisfactory reports to be rendered, particularly on patrol duty.

3. World War experience implies that the negro may not stand grilling combat with heavy losses. In general the negro has confidence in white leaders and granted proper initial training before going into battle, he will follow the white leader with the utmost bravery. One of the peculiarities of the negro as a soldier is that he has no confidence in his negro leaders, nor will he follow a negro officer into battle, no matter how good the officer may be, with the same confidence and lack of fear that he will follow a white man. This last trait has been so universally reported by all commanders that it can not be considered as a theory - the negroes themselves recognize it as a fact.

VI. Combat training for the Negro.

1. The negro needs trained leadership far more than the white man needs it, and above all they need leaders in whom they have confidence, and whose presence they can feel and see at all times.

2. On account of the inherent weaknesses in negro character, especially general lack of intelligence and initiative, it requires much longer time of preliminary training to bring a negro organization up to the point of training where it is fit for combat, than it does in the case of white men. All theoretical instruction is beyond the mental grasp of the negro - it must be intensely practical, supplemented by plain talks explaining the reasons for things in simple terms. It is necessary to distinguish the negroes' ability to memorize a subject from a true understanding of this subject. Since a large amount of individual instruction will be found necessary in a negro organization, it is desirable to have about double the number of instructors with them as with a white organization. Due to the special necessity of close observation in the lower units of negro organizations - platoons - the same need of a double complement of lieutenants in combat is apparent.

3. On account of the ever present danger of "rape cases" and the conflict between the economic side of the question and racial feeling, the negro, generally speaking, should be trained in the locality from which drafted, and there should never be a time when the negro organizations are not very much in the minority in any camp (general opinion is that they should never exceed 1/3 the strength of any camp).

VII. Size of Negro Combat Units.

1. Due to his susceptibility to "Crowd Psychology" a large mass of negroes, e.g., a division, is very subject to panic. Experience had indicated that the negroes produce better results by segregation and cause less trouble. Grouping of negroes generally in the past has produced demands for equality, both during war and after demobilization. The 92d Division was a failure, admitted by all competent officers in the division and by other trained observers and leaders.

Many of our Organized Reserve Divisions are approaching completion as to units. Their organization is voluntary - to force a negro unit upon them would mean their disintegration as soon as the present obligation of the officers expired.

2. General Pershing stated that he wanted organizations no larger than a regiment to be used as were the regiments of the 93d Division. The defeat of a regiment would stop the action of a division and possibly that of a corps, it can hardly cause disaster to an army, nor, if reserves are available, to a corps or division. A regiment in defense generally has 2 battalions on the line - the negro is weak on defense and especially liable to losses in raids. The best opinion on the subject as a compromise between safety and morale in choosing between a regiment and a battalion would favor the selection of the battalion as the largest negro unit initially.

3. There is no apparent reason why one arm of the service should use negro troops and another should not. One arm may require more educated men and specialists than another, but so long as men of suitable qualifications can be found, there is no reason to exempt the arm. On the other hand it would be foolish to make up any arm of men lacking the necessary qualifications.

VIII. Detailed Extracts from various sources relative to the performance of Negro in Past Wars.

1. All of the foregoing data is a general statement arranged in narrative form but extracts from signed, official statements of competent military officers who had the interests of the negro at heart, but not to the exclusion of making any lowering of the required standards for military efficiency in battle. The general trend of those comments may be summed up as follows:

"The services of the negro in past wars has been most satisfactory in the capacity of labor troops and while not entirely satisfactory in combat, he should be given an opportunity to prove his worth under trained leaders, preferably white."

2. The following extracts are given in complete detail:

(a) Extract from Supplement No. 1 to Report of Committee No. 7 entitled "Historical Study of the Employment of Negro Manpower in War."

UNITED STATES

Introductory

So far as the United States is concerned we may consider the negro to be descended from the slaves who were imported principally during the 18th and early part of the 19th Century from the West Coast of Africa. They belonged to the true negro stock, which shows great similarity of physical characteristics, qualities which have been greatly altered due to continued crossing with whites since arrival in this country.

The West Coast negro, according to the best authorities, is very low in the scale of human elevation; his brain capacity averages about 35 ounces as contrasted with the white man's 45 ounces. He did not belong to the warrior tribes, such as are found in South Africa, but on the contrary was peaceable, indolent and backward.

After being brought to this country his status as a slave gave him almost no legal rights, did little to raise his moral standards, and instead of producing the qualities so necessary in a soldier of individual courage, initiative and pride of nationality or race, acted in quite the contrary manner. These facts are necessary to consider in studying the history of the American negro in the various wars in which he has participated.

The study herewith is merely an outline with such conclusions as seemed pertinent.

Revolutionary War.

The question of employing negroes as soldiers was considered very early in the Revolution. In 1775 Washington prohibited in orders the enlistment of any negro. Notwithstanding this fact, it seems evident that a few free negroes had been in the army since the beginning of the war. Later the re-enlistment of such of these as had been discharged was authorized.

A number of efforts were made during the course of the war by various individuals to get the States to enlist slaves, the reward being freedom. Most of these plans were not favorably received. However, there is no doubt that during the entire war, negro slaves and freedom were in the ranks and continued to be enlisted in most of the states, especially when the pressure for recruits increased toward the latter years of the struggle. A return of August, 1778, showed 755 in Washington's Army two months after the Battle of Monmouth.

An attempt to raise a negro organization was made in one instance only; this was the so-called "Rhode Island Black Regiment," authorized by the legislature of that State in 1778. It really was a battalion of four companies, and participated creditably in a number of actions from 1778 until the end of the war. The greatest number of negroes in the organization was in 1780, at which time 150 of its enlisted personnel were negroes, all of the officers being white. Many references are made of this being a negro organization, which is contrary to the facts shown above, for at no time was half of its strength colored.

Conclusions.

Apparently the principal reason for the enlistment of negroes was the difficulty of obtaining other recruits. No unit composed entirely of negroes was raised, and only in the Rhode Island Black Regiment was there an appreciable number. Here they were combat soldiers; elsewhere no reference has been found of the character of their employment. In this mixed organization they apparently performed satisfactory service.

The War of 1812.

During the earlier part of the war no colored troops were used, but as the struggle continued recruits became scarce as during the Revolution and again some steps were taken to enlist negroes. In October 1814, the Legislature of New York authorized the raising of two colored regiments, but no record has been found that indicates they were actually mustered into the service. However, some individuals were enlisted.

In September 1814, Andrew Johnson authorized the formation of two battalions of negro freemen which were commanded by Colonel Lacoste and Major D'Aquin. Both of those units had white officers and were on the line at the Battle of New Orleans. No specific record of their performances is given by Lossing other than the fact that the points where they were located which were in the vicinity of the American batteries, were not penetrated by the British attack, and apparently they performed their duty without criticism.

Conclusions.

Behind entrenchments, under white officers and with white troops on both sides and on the defensive, the negro troops behaved properly and gave satisfactory service.

The Mexican War.

No record has been found of the use of any negro troops during this period, and it is most probable that no separate colored units were formed.

The Civil War.

(a) The Union Army.

Prior to 1863 no use was made of negro troops by the Northern States; a number of plans had been discussed, but no action taken until President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was issued on January 1st, 1863, which among other provisions, declared that negroes would be admitted into the armed forces. The policy was to have white officers, although a few negroes were commissioned. During the war some 178,000 colored troops were enlisted which were organized into: five regiments of engineers, later turned into infantry; thirteen regiments of heavy artillery, one regiment and one battery of light artillery; one hundred and thirty-eight regiments and three companies of infantry. In several instances these regiments were grouped into and operated as divisions.

It is exceedingly difficult to get accurate information as to the negro troops in this war. To cull out the facts from the records of the Rebellion would be a task entirely out of the question in the time we are allotted.

for this study, and most writers on the subject have been either negroes or persons who approached the subject from a sentimental standpoint, both having as motives the glorification of the negro.

Negro troops actually took part in many of the battles of the latter part of the war among them Port Hudson, Fort Wagner, Fort Pillow, Petersburg, Nashville and Fort Fisher. Their conduct as a whole was good. However, there were instances of incompetence and even of mutiny as at Port Hudson where an entire regiment participated in a riot, attempting to shoot one of the officers. A number of the ringleaders were sentenced to be shot for this affair.

(b) The Confederate Army.

From the earliest days of the war negroes had been used by the Confederacy for work on fortifications and as teamsters and cooks. However, no steps were taken to regularly organize them as soldiers until late in the fall of 1864, when the Confederate Congress passed a law authorizing their use, but by not giving freedom to the slaves enlisted practically nullified the effect of the legislation. While a few negro companies were raised they did not participate in active service.

Conclusions.

Scarcity of volunteers and the great number of negro slaves who had attached themselves to the Union Army, coupled with the fact that as freemen there was a demand both sentimental and practical that they should participate in the burdens of war, caused the raising of negro troops. It was a natural sequence to the Emancipation Proclamation.

Such evidence as was examined showed that when well led by white officers their service was very creditable. Where they failed poor leadership was almost certainly to be found.

The Indian Wars.

With the reduction of the Regular Army after the Civil War and the reorganization of 1869 four regiments of colored troops were formed in the Regular Army, the 24th and 25th Infantry, the 9th and 10th Cavalry. Their officers have been white, except in a few scattered instances. These regiments participated in several of the Indian Campaigns and Skirmishes. Their service was creditable.

Conclusions.

The negro organizations always consisted of small companies and troops commanded by experienced white officers and in the ranks were many noncommissioned officers and soldiers of long service. Habits of discipline and confidence in their officers was largely responsible for their good service.

Spanish American War.

On the outbreak of war there were four regular regiments in the service, the 24th and 25th Infantry, the 9th and 10th Cavalry. These had white

Officers throughout, while in the ranks were noncommissioned officers, most of whom had several enlistments; and indeed many of the private soldiers also had long service. All four of these regiments participated in the Santiago Campaign, suffered losses and all did good service according to all reports.

In addition to the regular regiments five State volunteer regiments and four so-called Immune Regiments were raised. None of these regiments had active service. Most of these volunteer regiments had white officers in the higher grades, but a few had colored officers throughout. As these did not get into action no opportunity was given to test their combat value.

Conclusions.

No separate organization larger than a regiment of colored troops participated in the war. Even these regiments were approximately the size of a battalion under our modern system of organization. The character of leadership of white officers, the length of service of the enlisted men, the discipline of the regular troops and the offensive character of the campaigns against a much inferior enemy did not put the negro troops to the severe test that modern war would demand of the hastily raised troops that compose a national army. While the service of the colored regular regiments was satisfactory, it is far from conclusive as to what might be expected of new troops under more trying conditions and less efficient leadership.

Philippine Insurrection.

All four of the regular regiments participated at some time in the campaign against the Philippine Insurgents. None of them were present during the earlier months when the organized armies of the Insurrectos were in the field. The personnel of these regiments was practically the same type as during the Spanish war.

In addition two volunteer regiments, the 48th and 49th were raised and saw service. In these the company officers were colored, being chosen largely from the noncommissioned officers of the regular regiments. All field and staff officers were white, the former being Regular Army officers.

While all colored troops saw service they did not suffer any serious losses. A number of officers have commented on the fact that where there was more or less continual sniping at sentries, particularly at night, the morale of the colored troops became appreciably lower than that in white organizations. There was also a tendency to affiliate with the natives, and there were some desertions to the insurgents.

Conclusions.

The character of service of the colored troops in the Philippines was not such that definite conclusions could be drawn as to their value as modern combat soldiers.

The World War.

During the World War, 367,710 negroes were inducted into the service

of the United States. They were organized into service and labor battalions, pioneer regiments of infantry; into one complete division, the 92nd, and the so-called 93d Division which in fact consisted of four separate infantry regiments. These two divisions were the only colored combat troops that actually saw front line service. The history of these two organizations is of particular importance as the facts are easily accessible and offer first-hand evidence of the action of negro troops in modern combat, when organized in large units.

Briefly, the history of the 92d Division is as follows: Organization started October 26, 1917, in seven different cantonments. The General Field and Staff officers were white, chosen from the Regular Army; originally company officers of infantry, artillery, (except the heavy regiment) engineers and machine gun units were colored, most of them graduates from the colored training camp at Des Moines, Iowa. Prior to departure from the United States the inefficiency of the negro officers of artillery caused them to be replaced by whites; and this was also done in the Engineers on arrival in France. It may be stated here that the colored officers training camp was for Infantry, and that many of the candidates were ex-noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army. It is a fact attested by all that the educational qualifications of these negro officers were far below the standards required for white officers. The enlisted personnel was well above the average run of the draft due to selective methods. Particularly was this true in the heavy artillery regiment and the Signal Battalion where efforts were made to have specially qualified men inducted into the service.

The division was brought to full strength just before embarkation, and sailed for France in June, 1918, where it went into a training area and spent seven weeks, the training being assisted by the assignment of a number of French officers and noncommissioned officers. From there it went on the line in the quiet St. Die Sector, remaining until September 20, when it was withdrawn and by rail and bus proceeded to the Argonne and became reserve for the 1st American Corps. One regiment, the 368th Infantry, was detached for duty as liaison group under the French 38th Corps and operated between that Corps and the left of the American forces. It was the only regiment that actually participated in the battle. A detailed study of its action has been made by the Historical Section of the Army War College. It is enough to say that it was on the line from September 26 to September 29, that it failed to make its objectives, withdrew without orders and became badly demoralized. The regimental commander showed that the principal cause of the failure was the inefficiency of the colored officers, and requested that 35 of them be removed for inefficiency and cowardice. Five of them were later convicted by General Court Martial for cowardice. The entire division was withdrawn and sent to the Marbache Area, another quiet sector. Here it remained until after the Armistice, taking part in the attacks of the 2d Army on November 10 and 11, operations of a minor character, but in which the division made an advance of about 2 kilometers, but nowhere was serious resistance encountered. The division showed a marked improvement over its work in the Argonne. The artillery which joined the divisions in the Marbache Sector gave fairly efficient support.

Of the various units in the division, the artillery and engineers had a fair degree of efficiency. The trains were well handled and transportation kept in better condition than in most white organizations. The Signal

Battalion was never equal to its task due to inability to obtain electricians, radio and telegraph operators. The infantry was never to be considered first-class. The Commander of the French Division under whom the 368th operated reported it as useless for combat.

A great deal of dissatisfaction among the negro soldiers and officers was fomented by negro agitators and magazines which continually attempted to force the race issue and bring forward claims for social equality.

To summarize, the 92d Division failed as a first-class combat unit, but nevertheless performed useful service on the defensive in quiet sectors.

The 93d Division consisted of the 369th, 370th, 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments. They were detached for duty with the French Army and always operated as parts of the French Division. The 369th was originally the 15th New York and had a number of colored officers, all of whom were ultimately removed, some of them being sent to the 92d Division. The 370th, a former Illinois National Guard regiment, during active service was commanded by a regular officer of long service with colored troops. In the 371st all officers were white. In the 372d originally there were many colored officers but most of these were ultimately eliminated. These four regiments saw service and did creditable work as combat troops, but according to reports were not as efficient as our white troops nor the French.

Conclusions.

1. The large number of negroes inducted into the service as a result of the draft necessitated their being organized into various types of units. The demand for services and labor troops was met by assignment of many of the uneducated ignorant negroes. The 92d Division was organized as a result of political pressure upon the administration. Political consideration also caused the formation of the negro training camp and the commissioning of some six hundred as officers.

2. As combat troops under modern war conditions they never rose to the standard of white units even when well led by white officers. The negro officers were educationally and in character far inferior to the whites, and troops under negro officers were unfit for battle against an aggressive active enemy.

3. As non-combatants in service and labor units and as drivers of animal and motor transports they did good service.

4. When grouped into units larger than a regiment they did not succeed, as thereby they lost touch with and sight of white troops as examples and supports.

5. No attempt was made to group negroes and whites in the same units, except that in some service units white noncommissioned officers were used as overseers, and successfully.

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

8. One of the most striking and significant features of the employment of negro soldiers, in all of the countries considered, is the uniform and emphatic conviction that negro troops are efficient and dependable only so long as led by capable white officers and noncommissioned officers. The reasons for this are not generally discussed in the references consulted, but may be ascribed to the following:

- (a) Low intellectual capacity.
- (b) Insufficient technical education.
- (c) Lack of leading men of officer material.
- (d) Lack of confidence of colored troops in officers of their own race.
- (d) The questionable wisdom of training military leaders for armed peoples of a race, in their present development, who are not considered capable of exercising beneficial control in their various communities.

IV. Conclusions.

In addition to certain special conclusions appearing in the discussion, the following general conclusions are drawn from the study:

1. That negro troops, in countries other than the United States, are employed largely for the protection and police of colonial possessions. In France they are employed to augment the insufficient manpower and ease the financial burden of national defense.
2. That negro troops in the United States are employed in war both from political reasons and from the standpoint that the negro citizen should share the responsibilities, burdens and dangers of the war-time activities of his country.
3. That under efficient white leadership negro troops have done effective combat service.
4. Under negro officers they have displayed entire inaptitude for modern battle. Their natural racial characteristics, lack of initiative and tendency to become panic stricken, can only be overcome when they have confidence in their leaders.
5. They are much more susceptible to panic and their morale is quickly lowered when they come under shell fire or suffer physical hardships.
6. Their principal use during the World War was that for which they are best fitted, viz., as service and labor troops, but with selected men under competent leadership they will become useful combat troops but not equal to American white soldiers.

(b) Extracts of Statement made by organization commanders of negro units relative service of negro combat troops in France.

Div. C.O. - 92d Div.

"I would not recommend the organization of colored units larger than the regiment. Colored troops to compare favorably with white troops must have better leadership than the whites."

Chief of Staff - 92d Div.

"If negro organizations must be formed, it would be better to add to every division of infantry an extra regiment - actually making it a service regiment. The negro will stand if led by white officers, but only to the point where they will have to suffer heavy losses under severe physical strain."

C. G. 183d Brigade - 92d Div.

"Negroes should be organized in small bodies with plenty of white superintendence. When assigned to larger units they should be distinctly in the minority. Grouped as a race they should preferably be used for non-combat service."

C. O. 365th Infantry

"The negro is unfitted as a combat soldier. The following is a verified actual incident. A white Major 92d Division thought it was best to take his blanket and go up to his front lines. In the morning he found his battalion circled around him."

"Negroes may be used with safety to form combat units providing they are officered entirely by white men and provided they are subjected to a period of training at least twice as long as is considered necessary in the training of white troops - otherwise they should be used as pioneer or labor troops."

C. O. 367th Infantry

"As fighting troops, the negro must be rated as second class material, this due primarily to his inferior intelligence and lack of mental and moral qualities."

C. O. 368th Infantry

"As a soldier the negro is absolutely dependent upon the leadership of white officers. Owing to the heavy casualties among officers of combat units it would be a dangerous situation were the officers to become casualties. I consider the negro should not be used as a combat soldier."

C. O. 370th Infantry

"The nucleus was the 8th Illinois Infantry. The conduct of the men was for the most part good. There was a large amount of illiteracy, which complicated the non-commissioned officer problem. I favor no larger unit than a regiment. The majority were willing to follow an officer anywhere and at any time."

C. O. 371st Infantry

"In a future war the main use of the negro should be in labor organizations. Before leaving for France a request for 25% extra officers was granted and permitted the greatest use of white leadership."

C. O. 372d Infantry

"My observation of the negro soldier leads me to believe that his services would be best utilized with labor troops or pioneer engineers. If circumstances require them to be organized into combat organizations, then combatant officers should all be white - also the noncommissioned officers."

C. O. 317th Engineers

"After the negro lieutenants of the regiment were replaced by white the improvement was such that its efficiency was but little less than that of the average white engineer regiment."

C. G. 167th FA Brigade

"As motor mechanics, both in their handling the tractors and trucks, the negroes were, in my opinion, fully as good if not better than white troops. In regard to personal equation it was my feeling that the men, if properly led were equal to any task to which they were set."

C. O. 350th FA

"The men compared better than favorably with the white brigade as regards to exposure to influenza and pneumonia. The conduct of the regiment under shell fire was satisfactory. The presence of a large body of discontented negroes in the U.S. trained in the use of arms offers an inviting field for enemy propaganda."

C. O. 351st FA

"I believe the artillery of the 92d Division made good in every way while at the front. In general colored troops should be used as labor units with the ultimate goal of front line troops for the most trustworthy and intelligent."

(c) Certain papers concerning the negro soldier as handled by officers of important positions in the War Department.

Papers attached - some parts particularly confirm the suggested conclusions.

REFERENCE "C"

THE NEGRO OFFICER

I. Combat Weaknesses.

The Negro officer in combat showed the following weaknesses mentioned by a great majority of the commanders of Negro units in combat.

a. They cliqued together and sought at all times to protect members of their own race, no matter whether they were right or wrong.

b. Their principal idea was not that they were in the service to fight for their country, but that they were there for the advancement of their racial interests.

c. They showed a lack of mental capacity for command.

d. They showed a lack of courage in the one engagement of the 368th Infantry, 31 of 91 officers were reported as either shamefully leaving the firing line or displaying incompetence in the combat - 5 were sentenced by G.C.M. to be shot for convicted cowardice (President disapproved proceedings).

e. The Negro soldier utterly lacked confidence in his colored officer.

f. Negro officers had no confidence in each other, nor did they always obey each other.

g. As a class the Negro officer was more concerned about personal appearance and having a good time than about proper performance of his duties.

h. In most instances the Negro officer was the first to go to the rear and abandon his men at the first signs of artillery or machine gun fire, leaving the men to shift for themselves.

i. In general the Negro officer was still a Negro, with all the faults and weaknesses of character inherent in the Negro race, exaggerated by the fact that he wore an officer's uniform.

II. The Colored Officers Training Camp.

1. The colored officers as supplied by Camp Dodge, judged by subsequent examination and test, were not properly trained, and had not been given sufficient written examinations to determine their suitability as officers. It must be remembered that the Negro can memorize drill regulations and theoretical principles by the yard, and repeat it all verbatim, but without the least understanding what it means. The previous record of these men was not such as would indicate that they would always have the moral stamina necessary to lead men in action. In fact, they were poor colored officers and not the best obtainable. The comparative intelligence rating of these candidates is as follows:

Comparative Rating - White and Negro Race				
	No. of Cases	Superior A & B	Average C, C, & D	Inferior D & D-
White - Rep. of entire country	93,793	12.1	63.8	24.1
	18,891	.7#	20.6	78.7

"National Academy of Sciences - Memoirs - page 707"

Only .1 in "A" grade-Officer Type, i.e.: 1/10 of 1 percent.

Comparative Rating - White and Negro Officer Tr. Camps				
GROUP	No. of Cases	Superior A & B	Average C, C & C-	D & D-
Negro Officers, Camp Dodge	273	11.5	75.8	12.7
White Officers, Training Camp Fourth Series - all camps	9,026	74.2	25.4	.2

"National Academy of Sciences - Memoirs - pages 735 and 863."

2. If it is seriously proposed to have combat colored officers then they should attend camps with white candidates, but grouped separately, and be forced to measure up to the same standards as the white, both as to entrance requirements and graduation (this was not done during the World War). Since the tests show that only 1/10 of 1 percent have the mental qualifications, a strict single standard would not produce more than 400 Negroes for combat assignment at the utmost. If it can be shown that the Negro is given an equal opportunity with the white man to qualify for commissioned grades, and that only his own lack of qualifications prevent his commission in the higher grades or in combat units, then social and political demands of the administration can be resisted.

III. Reserve and National Guard Negro Officers.

1. From data furnished by the Adjutant General and the Militia Bureau as of October 28, 1925, the following is the status of Reserve and National Guard Officers (Negro):

	Col.	Lt. Col.	Maj.	Capt.	1st Lt.	2nd Lt.	Total
Reserve Officers	1	2	24	126	275	260	688
National Guard Officers	1	1	6	51	50	41	150
Totals	2	3	30	177	325	301	838

2. A temporary embarrassment will occur in the drafting of a certain few National Guard colored units which now have Negro officers. A solution may be found in the employment of these units in the Zone of the Interior until such time as the machinery of reclassification, separation, etc., is in operation. Negroes in the Reserve Corps holding commissions should be assigned to non-combat units of Negro personnel.

In time of peace the number of Negro reserve officers should be limited by every means consistent with impartiality.

3. The Negro has been a failure as a combat officer and if given another opportunity to make good he should be held to the strictest accountability divorced from all sentiment and based on his ability to compete with the white officer. If in time of peace he is not competent to hold offices which would call for some of the qualities expected of an officer of the army, then he can not hope to have a double standard with lower qualifications in war, when the fate of the nation is at stake. The Negro has no right to expect preferential treatment over the Jew, Italian or other race - only efficiency and leadership must be recognized.

IV. Extracts from reports on Negro Officers submitted by Competent Army Officers who Tried Them Out in France.

Division Commanding General, 92nd Division:

"The mass of colored troops distrusted their colored officers - to them the colored officer was simply a "stuck-up" nigger - thus the Negro officer was handicapped by the prejudices of his own race."

Chief of Staff, 92nd Division:

"I do not remember in thirteen months service a single report coming from a Negro officer that ever gave sufficient information to base any plan thereon, and practically every report had to be checked up by some white officer."

Commanding General, 183d Infantry Brigade:

"The Negro officers did not take proper care of their men. They not only lacked initiative but lacked standing with their own men."

Commanding General, 184th Infantry Brigade:

"The Negro as an officer is a failure, and this applies to all classes of Negro officers, whether from Regular Army or from Officers' Training Camp."

Commanding Officer, 368th Infantry:

"I wish to go on record as expressing my opinion that colored officers as a class, are unfit to command troops in present-day warfare."

I.G.D. of Negro Division:

"The replacement of the combat colored officers of the 372nd Infantry by white officers had, for its effect, a better state of morale and discipline throughout the regiment; better instruction and better tactical control."

Commanding Officer, 317th Engineers:

"The improvement of the regiment upon the change from Negro lieutenants to white was phenomenal."

Commanding Officer, 370th Infantry:

"There were some good officers - hardworking and reliable men."

Commanding General, 167th FA Brigade:

"The few battery officers did not last through the training period."

- V. Important War Department papers concerning the Negro officer.
Papers follow.