CONFRONT THE ISSUE

JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT

TOUCH TO BEGIN
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the FBI arrested over 1200 Japanese aliens throughout the United States. Over the next several weeks, President Roosevelt received contradictory advice about further action. FDR’s military advisers recommended the exclusion of persons of foreign descent, including American citizens, from sensitive areas of the country as a safeguard against espionage and sabotage. The Justice Department initially resisted any relocation order, questioning both its military necessity and its constitutionality.

But the shock of Pearl Harbor and of Japanese atrocities in the Philippines fueled already tense race relations on America’s West Coast. In the face of political, military, and public pressure, Roosevelt accepted the relocation proposal. The Attorney General acquiesced after the War Department relieved the Justice Department of any responsibility for implementation. On February
Letter, J. Edgar Hoover to Edwin M. Watson

December 10, 1941

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover routinely forwarded information for the President through Military Aide and Presidential Secretary General Edwin M. "Pa" Watson. This December 10, 1941 letter and accompanying map show the locations of the 1,212 Japanese aliens considered to be disloyal or dangerous that were arrested by the FBI within 48 hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Additional maps gave the locations of the 620 German and 98 Italian aliens taken into custody.

President's Official File 10-B: Justice Department; FBI Reports, 1941; Box 15
Today, the decision to intern Japanese Americans is widely viewed by historians and legal scholars as a blemish on Roosevelt’s wartime record.

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On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 granting the War Department broad powers to create military exclusion areas. Although the order did not identify any particular group, in practice it was used almost exclusively to intern Americans of Japanese descent. By 1943, more than 110,000 Japanese Americans had been forced from their homes and moved to camps in remote inland areas of the United States.

*The documents contained in this selection are from the collections of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum and are intended to reflect the many sides of this issue*
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A former news reporter and columnist, J. Franklin Carter was a part of President Roosevelt's informal intelligence network. Carter had connections around the world with diplomats, government officials, the press, and business executives, including Chicago businessman C.B. Munson who was sent to the West Coast to assess the situation. This December 16, 1941 Memorandum from Carter to the President summarizes several earlier reports regarding the espionage threat, the reliability of other formal intelligence gathering agencies, and the loyalty of Japanese-Americans. (President's Secretary's Files; Subject File; Carter, John Franklin, Nov.-Dec. 1941; Box 97).
Assistant to the Attorney General James H. Rowe, Jr., was the most ardent critic of the proposal to relocate and intern Japanese-Americans. He denounced the proposal as unconstitutional, and believed that it was being forced on the administration by public hysteria. In this February 2, 1942 Memorandum to the President’s private secretary Grace Tully, Rowe warns the President of the growing public pressure and the constitutional issues involved. (James H. Rowe, Jr. Papers; Assistant to the Attorney General Files; Alien Enemy Control Unit; Box 33).
Document 4: Memorandum to the President from Attorney General Francis Biddle, February 17, 1942:

This Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to President Roosevelt was Biddle’s last, best attempt to steer the President away from the massive, immediate evacuation and internment of Japanese-Americans being proposed by the military. In this memo, Biddle clearly tries to limit the Justice Department’s involvement in relocating American citizens, while at the same time warning Roosevelt not to bend to pressure from Congress and from the public outcry being created by outspoken columnists Walter Lippmann and Westbrook Pegler. Lippmann had recently written that “Nobody’s constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on a battlefield”, and in a widely read column, Pegler had declared “The Japanese in California should be under armed guard to the last man and woman right now, and to hell with habeus corpus until the danger is over.” (President’s Official File 18: Navy Department, March-April 1942 (Box 7).
the F. B. I. have indicated that this is not the fact. It comes close to shouting FIRE! in the theater; and if race riots occur, these writers will bear a heavy responsibility. Either Lippman has information which the War Department and the F. B. I. apparently do not have, or is acting with dangerous irresponsibility.

It would serve to clarify the situation in the public mind if you see fit to mention it.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Attorney General.
This letter from Sen. Harley Kilgore, a Democratic member of the powerful Senate Committee on Military Affairs, is an example of the political pressure to deal with the issue of Japanese-Americans on the West Coast that Roosevelt was receiving. The letter was received by the White House the day after Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066. (President's Official File 4805: Military Areas, 1941-1942).
Following established procedure, the Bureau of the Budget reviewed the final Executive Order prescribing military areas as drafted by the Justice and War Departments. In this letter transmitting the Executive Order to the President for his signature, Budget Director Smith makes reference to the “personal conference” held at Attorney General Francis Biddle’s house on the night of February 17, 1942 at which the Justice Department finally acquiesced to the issuance of the Executive Order as proposed by the War Department. James Rowe assisted in the revision of the language to ensure that the Justice Department would take no part in the implementation of the order. (President’s Official File 4805: Military Areas, 1941-1942).
FOR THE PRESS IMMEDIATE RELEASE FEBRUARY 20, 1942

The President has signed the following Executive Order:

AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY AREAS

WHEREAS the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 539, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1250, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 659 (U.S.C., Title 20, Sec. 154);

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.

I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem necessary to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinbefore authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.

I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.

This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8970, dated December 15, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of Military areas hereunder.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 20, 1942.

**PULL QUOTE:**
Citizenship has its responsibilities, as well as its privileges, and, in time of war, the burden is always heavier….To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.
MAIN QUOTE:
Citizenship has its responsibilities, as well as its privileges, and, in time of war, the burden is always heavier…. It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers -- and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps, with all the ugly connotations that term implies -- we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and, finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders -- as inevitably it must -- determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot -- by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight -- now say that, at that time, these actions were unjustified.

**PULL QUOTE:**
The roundup of Japanese Americans that Roosevelt delegated through the War Department… went far beyond the accepted powers of the government to intern foreign nationals and resident aliens.
The roundup of Japanese Americans that Roosevelt delegated through the War Department… went far beyond the accepted powers of the government to intern foreign nationals and resident aliens. Most of the 110,000 “evacuees” from the West Coast could not have been interned under any interpretation of U.S. law – because they were citizens. And the Issei (the first generation of immigrants) among the larger group – who were not citizens, even though they had lived in the United States for decades – had been barred from citizenship by law for decades. In this key respect they differed from German and Italian immigrants, who faced no such barriers…. Executive Order 9066 actually gave the government even greater authority than martial law. Unlike internment, which had well-defined legal procedures and boundaries, and unlike martial law, which was meant to apply universally rather than single out Japanese Americans, the “exclusion,” “evacuation,” “assembly,” “relocation,” “registration,” “segregation,” and “distribution” of Japanese Americans were almost completely open-ended and unconstrained. Policies and procedures were invented month-to-month and enforced with an arbitrariness that should have alarmed, and should continue to alarm, both civil libertarians on the left and opponents of big government on the right.

**PULL QUOTE:**
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On February 19, 1942, in one of the shabbiest displays of presidential prerogative in American history, Roosevelt approved Executive Order 9066, authorizing the forcible evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific coast. Racism fed fears of sabotage. For fifty years anti-Japanese sentiment had pervaded the social structure of the West Coast. Politicians jumped on the bandwagon. By the end of January the entire California congressional delegation, as well as Democratic governor Culbert L. Olsen and Republican attorney general Earl Warren, was clamoring for removal of the Japanese. Japanese evacuees were forced to liquidate their property at fire-sale prices. The U.S. government made no effort to secure fair prices, guarantee land values, or ensure the safety of goods placed in storage. “I am not concerned about that,” FDR told [Treasury Secretary] Morgenthau on March 5, 1942. Estimates of Japanese property losses exceeded $400 million in 1942 dollars – the current equivalent of almost $5 billion. After the war Congress provided a meager $35 million in reparations. Forty years later another Congress awarded each surviving detainee an additional $20,000. Though Roosevelt said he later regretted “the burdens of evacuation and detention which military necessity imposed on these people,” he showed no concern when he signed the measure on February 19.
PULL QUOTE:
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The President did not conduct the internment alone, and he should not be saddled with the entire burden of guilt. Nevertheless, Roosevelt failed to transcend the prejudice around him in his direction of public policy. Because of his early training and experiences, FDR was ready to believe that Japanese Americans posed an indiscriminate threat to national security, and he persisted in this belief without ever attempting to check the credible information to the contrary. He also deserves censure for not providing moral and constitutional leadership. Although his duty as President of the United States was to protect the constitutional rights of all citizens, he repeatedly subverted the rights of those of Japanese descent. His decision to sign Executive Order 9066 was made casually, with no consideration or weighing of the racial or constitutional implications of that action. After he ordered the evacuation, Roosevelt effectively stripped the internees of their property and possessions, but he did not offer any restitution or just compensation for their financial losses. He did not consider instituting immediate loyalty hearings, even though the government later took the position in Court that the loyalty of Japanese Americans could be so determined…. And finally, Roosevelt bears a special measure of guilt for his inability to project any real sympathy or consideration for the concerns and interests of the interned Japanese Americans. FDR made little effort to defend the internees from the stigma of disloyalty in the months after Executive Order 9066 was signed, and he took no recorded steps to improve conditions in the camps.